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Calculating failure: The making of a calculative infrastructure for
forgiving and forecasting failure
Liisa Kurunma¨ki and Peter Miller*
Department of Accounting, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
This paper examines how the category of failure was economised and made calculable.
It explores the preconditions for this shift in three stages. First, it explores how failure
came to be ‘forgiven’ in both the US and the UK across the nineteenth century, how it
came to be defined as something that is economic or financial, rather than personal or
moral. Second, it explores the rapid growth of narrating and rating failure in the mid-
nineteenth century, with particular attention to the formation of credit rating agencies
from the 1840s onwards. We consider also the roles played in this process by two
fortuitous technological developments: the typewriter and carbon paper for copying.
Third, we examine the emergence of the calculative infrastructure, which has helped to
establish an industry of attempts to forecast failure from the beginning of the twentieth
century, initially on the basis of financial ratios, and more recently through the use of
risk indexes. We use the term ‘calculating failure’ to describe this transformation and
economisation of both the ideas and the instruments of failure, and suggest that this has
significant implications for the study of strategy.
Keywords: Accounting; bankruptcy; calculative infrastructure; calculative technol-
ogies; credit rating; economisation; failure; insolvency; marketisation
The machine was there; and because it was there, it had to work, and once it was running, it
began to accelerate.1
Introduction
The category of failure now saturates public life. This emphasis on the flipside of strategy
is unsurprising, given the scale of the economic crisis now facing us. But the phenomenon
both predates and extends far beyond current corporate failures, the potential failure of
entire national economies, or even the possible failure of sets of interdependent
economies. Notwithstanding a century and more of attention to corporate failure, the
category of failure now has an even larger territory. Across the past two decades or so, the
notion of failure has been applied also and increasingly to public services such as schools,
hospitals, social work, prisons, universities and much more besides.2 Here, the notion of
exit has become the watchword for those seeking to assess and regulate in the name of
markets, where strategies sometimes succeed and sometimes fail.
This paper examines the preconditions for this generalisation and economisation of the
idea of failure. It explores how failure came to be ‘forgiven’ across the nineteenth century
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in both the US and the UK, in particular through repeated bankruptcy legislation. It
examines how the narrating and rating of failure burgeoned from the 1840s onwards, and
the role played in this process by two fortuitous technological developments: the
typewriter and carbon paper for copying. It also shows how the subsequent industry for the
forecasting of failure, which emerged from the early twentieth century onwards, was made
possible by the creation of an elaborate chain of calculations, much of it based on
accounting numbers. We use the term ‘calculating failure’ to describe this transformation
and economisation of both the ideas and the instruments of failure; and we use the term
‘calculative infrastructure’ to designate the relatively stabilised chain of accounting
calculations and associated narratives, the ensemble of calculative technologies and
rationales that has come to appear necessary for the assessment of both failing and failure.3
Today, after a process that extends back to the mid-nineteenth century and that took place
at a somewhat different tempo on either side of the Atlantic, failure has become something
that is economic or financial, rather than a personal or moral phenomenon. As cultural
historians have recently shown, in the early nineteenth century failure was still deeply
personal, encapsulated in the term ‘loser’ and other associated terms.4 The various
attempts during the nineteenth century to figure out whether and how to forgive failure
were not only economic and legal matters, but were profoundly cultural. This redefinition
of failure as economic rather than moral, as arising from risk rather than sin, was a key part
in the forming of a liberal economy.5 The economic domain had, as it were, to be
constituted qua economic domain.6 This required an acceptance of the idea that the
vicissitudes of capitalism could lead to personal failure, despite hard work. But it required
more than a transformation of the idea of failure. It required also a set of practices and
processes for orderly and equitable exit from the market game.7 Further, it required the
forming of an entire calculative infrastructure, a complex chain of calculative practices
and their associated rationales, for predicting and pronouncing failure. Accordingly, we
examine here both the transformation of the idea of failure, and the forming of a
reciprocally related chain of calculations – including credit rating, financial statements,
ratio analysis, and risk indexes – through which failure has been made calculable.
In calling for attention to be paid to the forming of this calculative infrastructure, some
words of clarification and caution are appropriate. First, and notwithstanding several
decades of social constructivism both within accounting research and beyond, as well as a
decade or so of performativity among economic sociologists, it remains important to
emphasise that the actual moment of failure has none of the objectivity and inevitability
typically attributed to it.8 That moment surfaces within and through an assemblage of
calculative practices, financial norms, legal procedures, expert claims and modes of
judgment. These allow complex processes of mediation between a variety of actors,
domains and desired outcomes. This is of course not to deny that failure, when it occurs,
often has devastating implications for individuals, families, towns, regions and even entire
economies or sets of economies. Nor is it to trumpet the virtues of constructivism relative
to realism. For failure, one might say, is a variable ontology object. It is resolutely real for
those who lose their jobs, their homes, their incomes, their savings or their pensions. But it
is also undeniably constructed through the multiple ideas and instruments that set the
parameters within which open-ended yet not limitless negotiation and judgment takes
place, as the moment of failure is either predicted or pronounced. The more this process of
construction takes place, and the more it is stabilised, the more real it becomes. When this
process of construction reaches a certain point, the realities of unemployment, bank
repossessions, child malnutrition, and much more besides present themselves
uncompromisingly.
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Second, and correlatively, it is important to distinguish between failure and failing, a
distinction internal to regulatory and policy discourses, and itself subject to multiple
processes of judgement, interpretation and mediation. Failing is often a protracted process
with no necessary end point, and certainly no inevitability that actual failure will follow.9
Failing precedes the moment of death, and interventions directed at those entities
considered to be failing may delay further decline and avert failure. The notion of failing
goes hand in hand with a whole set of devices and processes for assessing performance,
comparing it with the performance of others, deciding what problems exist, assessing how
severe they are and whether they can be remedied, and setting out what might be done to
alleviate or overcome them, whether this be refinancing, the devising of a new ‘strategy’,
closures, forced disposals, direct or indirect government support or whatever. In contrast
with the finality and gloom of failure, and despite its negative connotations, the notion of
failing has a residually optimistic dimension, for it entails at least the possibility of cure.
Also, failing is about prediction rather than pronouncement. It is about the future rather
than the past. For more than a century, a range of agencies have sought to develop tools for
assessing the propensity of an entity to fail, whether to assess credit-worthiness or the
likelihood of default. Long established for the corporate world, these predictive
instruments are now surfacing in domains such as healthcare as part and parcel of a much
broader economisation of the entire social field.10
Third, a principle of delimitation is in order. By suggesting a focus on the generalising
and economising of failure, our concerns do not extend to all and any case of failure. We
are concerned only with those domains that have been largely or significantly economised,
or that are in the process of being so transformed, and to which the term failure has been
attached. Equally, and in so far as our concern is with a set of calculative practices whose
components have spread beyond the domain of corporate failure, our concern here does
not extend to the consumer credit scoring industry that others have so fruitfully
examined.11 Our focus, rather, is on the idea of failure viewed as an economic event
pertaining to an entity or entities, and the chain of calculations – particularly financial
statements, ratio analyses, and risk indexes – through which it is both predicted and
pronounced.
Fourth, it is worthwhile noting the continuing and still growing importance of the
category of failure in liberal societies. Here, the generalisation and economisation of
failure is part and parcel of an ongoing process of marketisation. It is difficult to separate
the language and metrics of failure from the aspiration to extend the market game for
public services to its natural conclusion: the point of exit. In so far as public services are
designed increasingly according to the rules of the market game, it seems that the entities
providing them now have to be allowed to fail according to the same rules. At least in
principle, bankruptcy law in some shape or form may now be equally applicable to public
services as well as the corporate world.12 For the regulation of these very different
domains is circumscribed by the need, in a liberal society, to ensure transparent and
equitable arrangements for identifying failings and pronouncing failure, yet without giving
rise to a limitless expansion of the domain of regulatory intervention. Such developments
have only been made possible by a century and more of transformations of the ideas and
instruments of failure for the corporate sector, which have now become the template for an
attempted economisation of the entire social field. It is these transformations that we
consider in this paper, for these have provided the conditions of possibility for the current
attempts to economise as much of the social field as possible.13
We examine these issues in three stages. First, we consider the ‘forgiving’ of failure,
which took place at differing speeds in the US and the UK through repeated legislation on
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bankruptcy across much of the nineteenth century. Second, we examine the rapid growth
in the narrating and rating of failure from the 1840s onwards, with particular attention paid
to the formation of credit rating agencies. Third, we examine the emergence from the early
twentieth century onwards of a calculative infrastructure that has founded an entire
industry of attempts to forecast failure, initially on the basis of financial ratios, and more
recently through the use of risk indexes.
Forgiving failure
The initial step towards the economising of failure was the forgiving of failure, a
faltering process that took place in the US and the UK across much of the nineteenth
century. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, failure was deeply personal and
moral, as encapsulated in the term ‘loser’ and other comparable labels.14 A hundred years
before the Great Crash of 1929, American men were already jumping out of windows,
preferring death at their own hands to a life of disgrace. But, if the terms ‘failure’ and
‘loser’ went hand in hand, in so far as they tallied the economics of capitalism and
personal identity, and if such categories are intrinsic to the cultural history of capitalism,
there was also a movement that sought to forgive failure through an economising of
personal identity and recognition of this in law. Throughout the course of the nineteenth
century, and with many halts and reversals on both sides of the Atlantic, it came to be
accepted in law that failure might arise from risk rather than sin. Put differently, the gap
between rectitude and reward, character and failure, grew increasingly.15 It was gradually
accepted that the vicissitudes of capitalism could result in failure, despite honest dealings
and hard work.
This changing meaning of failure was given substance through legislation. Initially,
and in the US, this was through the short-lived US Bankruptcy Act of 1800.16 This was
given a five-year term by Congress, but it was repealed after only three years.17 Despite
subsequent perennial debates, no further federal legislation was passed until the
Bankruptcy Act of 1841. The 1841 Act introduced for the first time the principle of
voluntary bankruptcy, and covered all individuals, not just merchants and traders.18 But
the 1841 Act had come under attack even before it went into operation, and within little
more than a year it was repealed.19 Almost a quarter of a century passed before Congress
enacted another bankruptcy law.20 The 1867 Bankruptcy Act, approved on the same day as
the Reconstruction Act (the first of four major provisions for readmitting former
Confederate states) promised a kind of national citizenship that meant that economic
failure would no longer result in individuals losing their capacity to transact. This was a
further important step in the economising of failure, albeit one that was to last only a little
more than a decade.21 Nonetheless, as Sandage eloquently puts it, the civil war ‘changed
the terms of political and economic activity in ways that expanded the constituency of
failure’.22 ‘Liberty and slavery’ gave way to ‘success and failure’ as new measures of
human worth. In the post-war decades, this ‘new birth of freedom’ brought forth a ‘new
birth of failure’. Failure was no longer indelibly inscribed in the character of an individual,
but was a function of a more circumscribed economic domain, and one whose contours
could be quantified. Although the 1867 Act was repealed in 1878, the Act of 1898
reaffirmed the link between solvency and selfhood as conjoint speculative ventures
(notwithstanding further reversals). The enduring nature of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
which enshrined five fundamental principles, ensured that success and failure could be
viewed as just two sides of the liberal ideal that reshaped notions of selfhood in postbellum
America.23
Business History 1103
In England, the shift in meaning was comparable, even if the chronology differed
somewhat and even if the resulting systems and professional jurisdictions are substantially
different.24 The Bankruptcy Act 1831 radically changed the institutional and legal
framework for dealing with insolvency by the establishment of a Court of Bankruptcy in
London and the creation of a new figure, the official assignee.25 The Winding-Up Act of
1848 regulated the control of liquidations, and made the appointment of a public
accountant a virtual necessity.26 The Bankruptcy Act of 1861 permitted debtors to absolve
themselves of their liabilities by making themselves voluntarily bankrupt.27 The
Companies Act 1862 – often referred to as the ‘accountant’s friend’ – established the
position of ‘official liquidator’, and the Debtors Act 1869 reduced the ability of the courts
to detain those in debt, although some provisions remained.28 With this shift, insolvency
became a business in and of itself, and provided the core activity and source of revenue
during the second half of the nineteenth century for the newly emerging accounting
profession.29 From then on, and notwithstanding some changes introduced in the 1883
Act, including a new procedure called ‘public examination’,30 imprisonment was to be
reserved for the punishment of crime, and not the lot of misfortune in trade.31 The system
put in place with the Bankruptcy Act of 1883 remained in place for just over a century, and
provided the structure for the supervision and administration of bankruptcy until the
passage of the Insolvency Acts of 1985 and 1986.32
However, before the economisation of failure could be fully operationalised, a new set
of metrics for forecasting failure had to be devised, together with the financial information
on which they could be based. And before this could happen, a prior shift was required, the
forming of an information infrastructure for narrating and rating failure. Accordingly, in
the next section we consider the emergence, from the 1840s to the final decade of the
nineteenth century, of an entire new industry for the conjoint narrating and rating of
failure.
Narrating and rating failure
Forgiving failure is one thing, forecasting it another. The two things developed in close
parallel, however. An initial step in this process was the establishing of a vast information
infrastructure, albeit one that to begin with neither quantified failure nor rendered its
likelihood probabilistic. Lewis Tappan’s Mercantile Agency, a direct ancestor of Dun &
Bradstreet, began this process on 1 August 1841, when it opened its doors in lower
Manhattan.33 This was just four years after the worst depression until then in the US. The
Agency sold ‘information with regard to the credit and affairs of every man of business’,
and quickly established itself as a ‘kind of intelligence office for the whole country’, in the
words of Henry Thoreau.34 The Mercantile Agency sought to manage risk and forecast
failure by recording and managing identity, and on a scale that hitherto had not been
imagined. Tappan, an ardent social reformer, quickly established an information
infrastructure for the newly emerging national markets, which themselves were supported
by increased speed of transport and communication. Such technological developments as
telegraphy, the railroads, and steamboats had not been matched by an information
infrastructure that would allow assessments of credit-worthiness to those that were distant
and anonymous.
The Mercantile Agency emerged at a time when few other national economic
institutions existed. It depended entirely on local informants who, in lieu of payment,
received a portion of any debt collected from local defaulters. Within five years of its
creation in 1841, Tappan had enlisted 679 local informants, and this had reached 2000 by
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1851.35 In that year, the inflow of information kept 30 clerks busy; on an average day, the
firm received 600 new or updated reports, and answered 400 enquiries. From then on, the
national marketplace had an institutional memory, one that blended morals, finances, past
performance and future prospects into a summary judgment that depicted and managed
identity case by case.36
This network of ‘correspondents’ continued to grow across the remaining decades of
the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, such that by 1941 there were 50,000
in the US and 8000 in Canada.37 Many criticised the network of informants as little more
than snoopers, snitches and spies, but Tappan defended them ardently.38 Nonetheless, the
agency shielded informants behind code numbers, and typically did not copy their names
into its volumes. Correspondents were expected to send updates every six months, answer
urgent queries, and warn of imminent collapses. ‘Failed & now in Boston’ stated a typical
entry in 1848 about a tailor who absconded from Worcester; ‘be sure & never trust him,
will always be worthless’.39 A somewhat hedged report in 1854 from Ohio stated: ‘I think
he will fail before long if he has not already’, and a Cincinnatti agent wrote in 1862 that
‘the impression here is that they are bound to go under’.40 A report in 1860 in Jackson
County, Alabama, stated: ‘The general opinion here is, that he is in a v[er]y critical and
embarr[asse]d condition, and that there is a strong probability of his failure’.41 So, while
the law concerning bankrupts oscillated throughout the nineteenth century, sometimes
punishing and sometimes forgiving failure, credit agencies sought to predict failure, albeit
in a manner that today appears unfamiliar.42
By the 1860s, ‘bad egg’ was typical of the plain-speaking terms used in the credit
reports that made failure indelible and a commodity. But rating and narrating at this time
remained inseparable: Americans had not yet learned to think of each other simply as
numbers.43 And, even after three decades of the Mercantile Agency, credit reports were
still not standardised. As late as 1869, the firm assumed that the wisdom of its informants
was such that they did not need to be told ‘what to look for’.44
Nonetheless, the late 1860s and the 1870s brought significant changes, and set the
stage for the subsequent and more enduring economising of failure in the following
decades. First, and on a scale that may appear rather modest today after a century and more
of standardisation, there were attempts to standardise credit reports. It is worth recalling
that the typical credit reporter in the US at this time was someone – often English, Scottish
or Irish by birth – who would ride or trudge from town to town in a harsh and sometimes
perilous environment.45 Much of the time of credit reporters was spent chatting with
traders, bankers, sheriffs and tavern keepers. Reports would be mailed once per week, and
one credit reporter related that he ‘didn’t see his superior for a year’.46 Credit reports for
small and remote communities were typically brief, financial statements were rarely
obtained, and trade information was negligible.47 Retailers at this time in the US,
particularly in the more remote regions, issued very few balance sheets or income
accounts. While a small but growing number of ordered financial statements appeared in
the larger eastern communities in the 1870s and 1880s, the credit reporter in the western
and southern states could do little more than guess at the assets and liabilities of retailers
on the basis of the immediate goods on the shelves, the cash on hand and liabilities due to
one or two principal suppliers.
In an attempt to standardise such reports, instructions were sent out in 1869 to the
correspondents of The Bradstreet Company, requiring them to itemise length of time in
business, amount of own capital in business, estimated net worth after liabilities, the
composition of estimated wealth (real estate, personal property, stocks, etc.), character
(good, fair, poor), habits (good, medium, poor), business qualifications (very good, good,
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medium, poor), prospects of success (good, fair, medium, poor), who they succeeded, and
the names of partners, together with their age.48 This was, apparently, the first attempt to
standardise and itemise the information required to analyse the moral and financial
character of individuals seeking credit. Until then, this was done more according to habit
or instinct of those filing the reports. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the extent to which
rating and narrating still went hand in hand well into the second half of the nineteenth
century, and also how closely linked moral and financial identities were at that time.
A second step in the development of credit reporting in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century took the form of two related and fortuitous technological
developments: that of ‘machines for writing with type’ and carbon paper for copying.49
In 1841, the first credit reports were written down by hand in huge ledgers by expert
‘scriveners’. When a subscriber desired credit information, he called at the office of the
Mercantile Agency, and the information in the ledger was read to him by one of the clerks.
The subscribers received the information verbally, and had to remember it as accurately as
possible. Subsequently, this routine was modified, and reports were copied by pen and ink
from the ledger pages and mailed or delivered to subscribers. In 1872, however, the first
credit report was reproduced by carbon paper, after several years of experimentation to
create a duplicating medium by applying shoe polish to yellow foolscap paper.50 In 1875,
the first commercial order ever given for typewriters was placed by the Mercantile
Agency. The order was for 100 machines, at a total price of US$5500, and was placed with
Christopher Latham Sholes, who for many years had been trying to interest businesses
with his invention with no success.51 The machines to fill this first order were
manufactured by E. Remington & Sons of Ilion, New York. They became known as the
model Remington No. 1. These twin developments – the typewriter and carbon copying –
revolutionised the small-scale reproduction of documents at their point of origin, and
transformed the possibilities for recording and reselling credit reports.
The credit-reporting industry prospered in the decades following the Civil War, and by
1880 R.G. Dun and the Bradstreet agency were a clear duopoly in the field of national
credit reporting.52 The suspension of ‘specie’ payment (coined money) from 1862 to 1879
increased the demand for credit reporting, credit periods shortened, and credit terms
became more specialised, with items such as jewellery commanding longer credit periods
than canned goods, which in turn commanded more time than perishable items such as
fresh fruits and vegetables.53 The number of full-time credit reporters increased, and they
began to specialise, at least in the larger cities. By the end of the nineteenth century, nearly
all manufacturers and wholesalers used the information provided by the credit-reporting
firms, with one estimate stating that approximately 70% of all orders were shipped based
on agency reports.54 That said, the methods used for assessing credit-worthiness remained
little changed between 1865 and 1890.55 Although full-time reporters covered the more
densely populated areas of the United States, in other areas the agencies continued to
depend on the reports of local attorneys, postmasters, bank cashiers and merchants.
Forecasting failure
In the 1890s, pressure began to build for a move towards forms of credit analysis that would
make possible ways of forecasting failure, calculating its likelihood rather than assessing it
on the basis of personal intuition and rumour. The birth of the ‘credit man’ was central to
this shift, which went hand in hand with the emergence of the large multi-unit corporation.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, large manufacturers and wholesalers in almost
all industries began to employ ‘credit men’, individuals whose only responsibility was to
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assess the credit-worthiness of existing and prospective customers. This began the process
of separating rating and narrating, and the transforming of uncertainty into calculated risk.
As one proponent of the new ‘profession’ of credit men claimed: ‘That credit man excels
who, taking what looks like a long chance, by such mental means and systematic methods
as he possesses shortens the chance and brings it to the point of safety’.56
Before 1890, ‘credit men’ had begun to form local associations to share information
and work out ways to deal with insolvents. The Panic of 1893, however, acted as a trigger
for the formation of a national group: the National Association of Credit Men (NACM).
Formed in Toledo, Ohio, in 1896, on the basis of a nucleus of 10 existing local
associations, it was incorporated in New York State the following year. Despite hesitation
and suspicion on the part of credit-reporting firms, attorneys, associations of retailers and
even credit men themselves, the new organization attracted 600 members initially. This
trebled during the first year, and by 1920 the NACM could claim a membership of over
33,000, making it one of the largest commercial organizations in the world at the time.
The NACM sought to enhance the status of credit expertise in a variety of ways, by
claiming unique technical skills and benefits to society, as is customary with newly
emergent bodies of expertise. It sought also to transform the domain of credit assessment
by calling for it to be represented as an economic domain, and by making it susceptible to
financial calculations. This was a challenge, however, since the majority of small
manufacturers and traders in the US at the end of the nineteenth century were unable to
calculate the extent of their liabilities or assets, and were similarly unable to assess
whether their business was profitable.57 As one report stated:
You will find in his store a couple of spindles, on one of which he puts the bills as they come
in, while on the other he puts the bills as he pays them. He may also have a blotter in which he
records the sales he makes on credit.58
The NACM sought to counter this lack of financial information by publishing a range of
manuals, pamphlets and newsletters. They even went as far as to recommend distributing a
pamphlet to retailers outlining a simple method for keeping accurate accounts, and prizes
were offered for the best essays on simple and effective methods of bookkeeping and
accounting for retailers. The NACM called for a standardising and an economising of the
information on which credit reports were based. The NACM published the first manuals on
credit management, and shaped the way credit reporting was to be understood in the early
decades of the twentieth century. The first of these manuals, titled Whom to Trust, and
written by credit man Peter Earling from Chicago, was published in 1890.59 In that
manual, Earling called for a ‘better understanding of the “Science of Credits”’, and sought
to point out ‘the causes that lead to success or failure’.60 The aims of the NACM went
beyond the relatively modest aims of the federal regulators of the time. In 1897, they
called for signed statements from all businesses. A decade later, having joined forces with
the American Bankers Association, they supported calls for audited financial statements to
be made more widely available, and worked together to pass laws in every state punishing
debtors who submitted false statements, whether to creditors or credit-reporting
agencies.61 The NACM called for greater uniformity of financial statements, arguing that
this would allow investors and creditors to compare businesses more easily.62 Such
arguments were in line with the arguments of the Progressive Reformers, who had begun
with attempts to standardise municipal accounts.63 Federal officials supported this and
sought to expand the practice into the private sector. Accountants, ironically, were less
enthusiastic, fearing that a system of standardised accounts in the private sector would not
be consistent with the multiple users and multiple objectives of financial reporting.64
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Undeterred, the NACM developed and sold ‘uniform statement blanks’, and by 1899 was
able to report that 133 firms were using the forms.
These developments greatly facilitated the forecasting of failure. In particular, they
supported the spread of ratio analysis, a ‘second order’ set of calculations that were made
possible by the greater availability and increasing uniformity of financial information that
began to occur from the late 1890s. The current ratio – current assets divided by current
liabilities – gained acceptance at this time, for it allowed creditors to predict the likelihood
that a firm would fail as a result of inability to meet payments.65 Banks began to rely
heavily on this ratio as a basis for approving loans.66 The ‘50% rule’ was widely touted;
this dictated that a borrower’s current liabilities should not exceed 50% of current assets.
The NACM’s Bulletin set out similar guidelines in 1902, and in 1905 James Cannon,
president of the Fourth National Bank of New York and an early president of the NACM,
recommended a set of ratios in a paper to the New Jersey Bankers Association.67
Ratio analysis gained momentum rapidly, once traders and manufacturers could be
represented as economic entities through financial statements. This occurred in the early
years of the twentieth century.68 In 1897, the NACM reported that over 80% of all reports
were still not based on any financial statements whatsoever. Five years later, things had
developed significantly, the figure being reduced to a little over 60%.69 The NACM
continued to argue for the critical importance of financial statements, even going as far as
to recommend that agencies withhold capital ratings from businesses that refused to
submit them. Gradually, across the first two decades of the twentieth century, the idea that
failure should be viewed as calculable and probabilistic took hold, even if credit men still
held to the axiom that credit-worthiness was determined by the ‘three Cs’: character,
capacity and capital. In so far as honesty remained the foundation for the reliability of
financial statements, the ‘honest failure’ should be forgiven also.70
Once themachinery of ratio analysiswas up and running, it could be put towork.And, once
put to work, it gained momentum. In 1905, Cannon, a pioneer of financial statement analysis,
spoke of the ‘rules of the credit science’ and the rationale for the 2:1 current ratio: that
companieswere looked atmore from a liquidation angle than as going concerns.71And, despite
endorsing the current ratio as a basis for assessing loans, he used asmany as 10 ratios in a study
of business borrowers. The following decade saw this multiplying of ratios given significant
publicity and legitimacy. In 1912, Alexander Wall, of the National Bank of Commerce,
Detroit, was asked by the Division of Analysis and Research of the Federal Reserve Board, to
prepare a report on the topic of credit and credit-worthiness.72 In a highly influential study
titled ‘Credit Barometrics’, and published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin in 1919, Wall
computed seven different ratios of 981 firms, stratified by industry and location, and detected
significant variation.73 This was a major step forward in the development and diffusion of ratio
analysis, for it marked a departure from the then customary usage of a single ratio.
In the wake of Wall’s ‘credit barometrics’, there was an explosion of publications on
ratio analysis during the 1920s. Trade associations, credit agencies, individual analysts
and academics all sought to contribute to what was termed ‘scientific ratio analysis’.74
Wall himself, in an effort to address the proliferation of ratios, developed an index of
ratios. This was effectively a weighted average of a range of ratios, with the weights being
the relative value attributed to each ratio by the analyst.75 In a similar vein, Bliss
developed a model of the firm that consisted entirely of interlinked ratios.76 Soon critics
began to appear. Wall was heavily criticised for his efforts, one particularly acerbic critic
describing him as the ‘incurably optimistic theorist futilely and absurdly chasing the ratio
absolute’.77 Another critic, Gilman, argued that ratios did not portray ‘fundamental
relationships within the business’.78
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Despite such criticisms, the development of ratio analysis continued unabated during
the 1930s. This was no doubt aided by the increased supply of financial statements, and the
formation of theUS Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934, in response to the
stock market crash of 1929. The SEC, in fact, began to publish ratio data of its own, as did
the National Credit Office in the late 1920s under the guidance of Foulke, who published a
group of ratios that eventually numbered 14.79 The latter were not widely promulgated,
however, until the 1930s, by which time Foulke had moved to Dun & Bradstreet.80 The
publication of these ratios was begun in 1933, in theDun&BradstreetMonthly Review, and
they quickly became the most influential and well-known industry average ratios.81
A further step was required, however. This was to make failure calculable, by linking
ratio analysis explicitly and empirically to the likelihood of failure. This was, of course,
implicit in the liquidation principle built into the 2:1 current ratio. But, as late as 1930, the
selection of ratios remained largely justified on the basis of experience and judgment, and
there was little or no empirical testing of the reliability of individual ratios as predictors.
This was to change, however, in the early 1930s, when a range of studies sought to
‘predict’, ex post, the likelihood of failure on the basis of a variety of ratios.
Numerous studies sought to identify those ratios which could serve as reliable
predictors of failure. Fitzpatrick studied 20 nationally-known companies that failed during
the 1920s.82 He calculated 13 ratios for each company for several years before failure, and
ranked four as being the best indicators of impending failure. In a second study, he
compared each company’s ratios with those of a comparable successful company, and
identified three ratios as being better predictors than the current ratio and quick ratios.83
Smith and Winakor studied 183 failures between 1923 and 1931, and identified substantial
variations in the ratios when analysed according to industry and firm size.84 Ramser and
Foster studied 173 companies that sought permission to sell securities in Illinois between
1919 and 1925, and claimed to detect differences in the ratios between those that failed by
1927 (about 30%) and those that did not.85 And, in 1942, Merwin published the results of a
comparable study that analysed a large number of ratios calculated from the accounts of
582 ‘continuing’ and ‘discontinuing’ small companies in five manufacturing industries.86
By comparing these ratios with industry mean ratios, he claimed to detect predictors of
‘discontinuance’ as much as four or five years prior to failure.
The ideas and instruments of failure act like a multiplying machine, a constantly
proliferating assemblage of actors, agents, practices, tools, instruments and ideas that is
defined by the temporarily stabilised relations between its constituent parts. By the 1940s,
a large and diverse set of actors had come together to predict and pronounce failure. This
included accountants and their professional associations, bankers and bank credit men,
credit men, credit rating agencies, lawyers, trade associations, labour unions, professional
educators, university professors and corporate management, as well as a panoply of
regulatory bodies, including the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Internal Revenue
Service, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. While all pursuing their
own discrete agendas and aspirations, and while also vying for prominence and claiming a
distinctive expertise or toolkit, this assemblage of actors had in common the aspiration that
failure was something that could be known, acted on and made calculable, with beneficent
results for firms, creditors, investors and society at large, as well as for those that simply
aspired to be able to identify failing organizations and predict the likelihood of their
failure.
Much has of course changed since the early 1940s. But, by then, and in the US, the
contemporary landscape for thinking about and calculating failure was largely in place.
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Failure could be forgiven, both legally and morally. Or at least honest failure could be. It
could be made calculable and predicted, even if the actual predictions (then, as now) were
rather shaky. The calculative infrastructure on which ratio analysis depended was legally
mandated, at least for listed companies.87 And, on top of the first order financial statements
produced by firms, and the second order ratios constructed out of them, a third order of
metrics – indexes of ratios – had emerged as part of the chain of calculations for seeking to
forecast failure and identify the characteristics of failing organizations.
After a gap of two decades or so, the predicting of failure became an academic
industry, one that spilled over into a set of adjacent industries, including banking, credit
rating and financial services more generally. A swarm of researchers appeared in the
1960s, many based at the University of Chicago, united by the common goal of
predicting failure and identifying the characteristics of failing and failed companies.88
Beaver defined failure as a company defaulting on interest payments on its debt,
overdrawing its bank account or declaring bankruptcy.89 To ‘predict’ failure, he
matched a sample of failed firms with a sample of non-failed firms and studied their
financial ratios for a period of up to five years before failure, and concluded that three
‘non-liquid’ ratios were the best predictors of failure, even for the year prior to failure, a
finding that was reinforced even when he extended his study two years later.90
In parallel, and outside the US, Tamari compared the ratios of failed companies with
those of all Israeli industries, and concluded that there were significant differences.91 He
cautioned against relying on one ratio alone, and constructed a risk index similar to that
compiled by Wall and Duning over three decades earlier.92 After assigning weights in a
fairly rudimentary manner, he concluded that his index made it possible to discriminate
between companies that subsequently failed and those that did not. Moses and Liao
pursued a similar line of enquiry some two decades later.93 Meanwhile, others such as
Altman moved away from univariate techniques and towards multivariate statistical
techniques such as multiple discriminant analysis, which took into account a number of
ratio characteristics at the same time.94 One influential model was the Z-score model,
which was to be successfully marketed for credit analysis, investment analysis and
going-concern evaluation. This was extended in the ‘Zeta’ model, which took account of
changes in financial reporting standards.95 Subsequent studies, pioneered by Ohlson,
developed conditional probability models based on non-linear methods to estimate the
likelihood of failure.96
Notwithstanding the nuances of the varied statistical models used, which matter
greatly to those seeking not only to improve the predictive powers of their model but also
to establish product micro-differentiation in the academic marketplace, the chain of
calculations deployed in recent decades in attempts to predict failure have much the same
contours as those developed several decades earlier. The building blocks – financial
statements, ratio analyses and indexes of ratios, however subtly computed – all remain in
place, much as they were in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Even a sympathetic recent
review of the literature has cautioned, in a review of nearly 150 studies conducted over a
period of 35 years, against ‘over-modelling’, and has drawn attention to the arbitrary
definition of failure typically used in predictive studies.97 However, our interest here has
been less to do with assessing the progress of this calculative juggernaut and more to do
with charting the huge number and range of studies that have been undertaken by both
academics and practitioners across the past half century or so in attempts to predict
corporate failure. For the creation of this vast machinery, with its incessant forecasts, is an
integral part of the calculative infrastructure that has facilitated the economising and
generalising of failure.
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Conclusion
Today, the notion of strategy is everywhere. Strategy provides one of the dominant narratives
for demonstrating the rationality of organizations to external bodies such as regulators and
analysts, and internal bodies such as boards. We have reached a point where it is almost
impossible to imagine organising without strategy.98 The assessment of an organization’s
strategy, however, is inseparable from the calculative infrastructure that we have examined
here. Risk indexes, credit ratings, Key Performance Indicators and suchlike are the metrics
through which the success, or otherwise, of a strategy is assessed. Put differently, failing and
failure – the obverse of a successful strategy – are always lurking in the wings. We have
documented here the forming of an elaborate calculative infrastructure for seeking to
identify failing and forecast failure. Scholars of strategy, we suggest, need to pay increased
attention to the range of calculative devices through which strategy is both articulated and
assessed.99 For it is typically through such metrics that the continuance, or otherwise, of
organizations is decided. This economising of failure is thereby an economising of strategy,
regardless of the gloss that may be provided by multiple strategic priorities.
We are witnessing today a generalising of this idea of failure, so that it is something
available equally to all. Whether in the private sector or in public services, it seems that
failure is ubiquitous. We have examined here the preconditions for this generalising of
failure, which is at heart an economising of failure. This commenced around the middle of
the nineteenth century, and is now being extended to the entire social field. We have
examined the various steps that were involved in this process. First, we considered the
rethinking of the notion of failure, which resulted in the forgiving of failure. Bankruptcy
legislation was central here, in so far as this accepted that economic failure might arise
from risk rather than sin. We then examined the emergence of an entire calculative
infrastructure for forecasting failure. An initial step in this direction was the rapid growth
of narrating and rating failure, through the emergence in the 1840s of the vast industry of
credit reporting, an industry that expanded substantially across the remainder of the
nineteenth century. The invention of ‘machines for writing with type’ and carbon paper for
copying played non-trivial roles in such developments.
The forecasting of failure gained greater momentum from around the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, once credit reports were
increasingly standardised and financial reports more widely available. The subsequent
development of ratio analysis and risk indexes consolidated this calculative infrastructure,
such that by the 1940s much of our contemporary apparatus for forecasting failure was in
place. Since then, the forecasting of failure has become a massive industry for both
academics and practitioners alike, albeit without reliable means yet for extrapolating from
populations to individual entities.
Our coverage of each step in the formation of this calculative infrastructure has, of
necessity, been brief, and we have no doubt missed out much. But we felt it important to
focus on the entire chain of calculations that is at issue here, rather than focusing only on
one particular metric or instrument. For it is only by linking primary financial records to
more or less standardised published financial reports that a series of second and third order
calculations can be established. And, once relatively standardised financial reports exist,
ratios can be calculated of them, which can themselves be multiplied. In turn, (risk) indexes
can be computed out of such ratios and financial reports, so that narrating and rating can be
firmly disassociated. This made it possible for commentators and analysts to focus wholly
or primarily on the single figure, which is so often the end point of such chains of
calculation.100 Our ‘modern’ calculative infrastructure for the economising of failure dates
from the moment that this chain of calculations was established and stabilised.
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A final point is worth emphasising. This is the reciprocity between entity formation
and the calculative infrastructure that surrounds modern economic forms, whether in
the private sector or increasingly the not-for-profit sector.101 In place of ‘reactivity’,102
we have examined here a process of co-creation, through which a financial and legal
entity has been formed in tandem with the calculative infrastructure through which it is
assessed and regulated. In so far as the different components of this entire edifice fit
each other, it is because they have been made to fit. Put differently, the making of
markets requires the formation of the entities that populate them, together with
allowance for their exit from the market game. It has taken roughly a century and a
half to fashion such reciprocity, and we are still a long way from coming to terms with
the implications of what has been created.
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